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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Russia's multipolar disorder 
At several recent international events, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has 
been echoing a familiar argument as a palliative to world problems, be they 
financial, security-related, or trade issues:  An international system with one, sole 
superpower at the apex is an inherently unstable system; a multipolar world, with 
several strong leadership centers somehow will provide a more stable, and 
therefore more desirable, configuration for international relations.  Give Russia 
credit where it is due – they are putting their words into action, at least 
domestically. 
 
As if to prove the instability inherent in American leadership in the world, Russia 
has been acting in contrary fashion and then attempting to justify its actions as a 
result of or response to uni-polar world affairs.  Georgia represents a worst case 
scenario of this behavior:  The Russian argument proceeds from the contentious 
assumptions that American support for NATO enlargement, to include Georgia, 
represents a threat to Russia's "privileged interests" in its neighbors, (1) and 
simultaneously that the American-led support for Kosovo, and particularly 
Kosovar independence, undermined the traditional supremacy of sovereignty in 
international relations.   According to Russia's envoy to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, "It 
is not possible to accept Kosovo's independence and to meaninglessly reiterate 
Georgia's territorial integrity."  (2)  The Russian extension of this argument holds 
that Russia is within its rights to unilaterally label an action on the territory of one 
of its neighbors as "genocide," and intervene militarily, wresting provinces from 
its neighbor and destroying its infrastructure.  Russia also asserted its desire to 
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oust (or even kill) the elected leader of Georgia, a verbal threat that has not been 
carried out…yet. (3)  
 
Russia's rationale for these actions places the responsibility for its own behavior 
at the feet of western, particularly American, governments:  Western interference 
in former Soviet republics in the guise of furthering their democratic development 
and encouraging their aspirations to join NATO represents the dark side of post-
Cold War international uni-polarity, which seeks to isolate Russia from its 
traditionally "close" relationships with its neighboring states.   Russia has been 
able to attribute a vast array of international "upsets" to the dangers of 
unipolarity, as evidenced by Medvedev's recent comments on Georgia: "When 
irresponsible adventurist actions on the part of a regime in a small country 
thoroughly disrupt the global situation, what other proof is needed that the 
international security framework based on the monopolar world concept is 
faulty?"   (4)  Theoretically, multi-polarity would allow Russia to reestablish its 
historical ties and to act with impunity towards its neighbors.   In this way, 
Russian actions in Georgia are both a result of an American-dominated uni-polar 
world (and condemned in such a system), and likewise would be the result of a 
multi-polar world.  However, in a multi-polar system, Russia theoretically would 
be acknowledged as a rightful hegemon in its own Eurasian center.  Either way, 
Russia's border states pay the price of Russian ambition, pride, and, once again, 
history. 
 
Domestically, Russia's current fixation with multi-polarity has played out for 
nearly a year now as President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin work out a 
diarchical power system, which obfuscates the actual seat of power.  The 
guessing game surrounding who would succeed Putin, a game which culminated 
in the two main candidates both being named First Deputy Prime Ministers in the 
Russian government, has now morphed into a debate over the relative status of 
the country's president vis à vis the prime minister.   Medvedev's recent proposal 
to amend the constitution and extend the terms of both the president and the 
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members of parliament has not fostered debate about the need for longer terms 
of service or periods between elections, nor even sparked a conversation about 
the ramifications of amending the constitution (something not done during Putin's 
presidency), but rather it has re-ignited the question of Putin's return to the 
Kremlin.  Medvedev's short interregnum has been hit with a self-inflicted wound 
to his legitimacy, as he appears more and more as a seat warmer for his 
predecessor's next appearance in the presidential offices. 
 
Putin himself does little to allay suspicions that he still is ruling the country, if not 
from the Kremlin itself, for now.  From his actions during the Russian invasion of 
Georgia, to his televised performance instructing the president how to behave 
(See previous Analysts), Putin has made clear that his decisions matter.  In a 
widely-reported incident a few days after his birthday, Putin also demonstrated 
that when he called, it was wise to come running.  "He called Russian journalists 
to his country home late Thursday without telling them why. Past midnight, after 
asking them "not to make noise, make a clatter or squeal," Putin ushered the 
curious journalists into the room where the tiger cub was waiting." (5) This story 
of the rare Ussuri tiger cub that Putin received as a birthday present ran through 
numerous international media outlets, but is it not a strange element to the story 
that Putin had reporters called to his dacha late in the evening, made them wait 
around until midnight, and then showed them a birthday gift he had received (by 
some reports days before)?  It sounds less like the action of a serious head of 
government in the midst of a financial crisis, then a brash and erratic 
authoritarian leader, making a point that he calls all the shots.  This is not the sort 
of governance once hoped for Russia.  Seventeen years after the emergence of 
the Russian Federation from the wake of the Soviet state, the Russian political 
system remains overly reliant on personalities, patronage tails, and clan loyalties.  
As one Russian analyst noted of the current situation: "We are living in a political 
system in which the formal institutions are a screen, and on the whole have no 
connection with real politics, while real politics are defined by interpersonal 
relations that are absolutely hidden from our view. 
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And this process is even gradually acquiring a somewhat grotesque character -- 
the closed and inexplicable nature of decisions, and even a lack of clarity as to 
who rules the country. 
It is unclear whether this comedy will continue for long, and it is unclear also 
whether society will long continue to tolerate these behind-the-scenes processes 
…." (6) 
 
Perhaps, in time, the benefits of “multi-polarity” in Russia's domestic affairs will 
become clear enough to the rest of the world that there will be movement to 
imitate the model on a broader scale.  In the meantime, Russia has a lot of work 
to do, both at home and abroad, before its vision is palatable to a wider 
audience. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) President Medvedev recently defined countries where Russia has "privileged 
interests" as follows:  "These are countries that are very important to us, 
countries with which we have been living side by side for decades, centuries, 
now, and with which we share the same roots.  Of course, I am referring to the 
nations that were part of the USSR, part of other state formations previously, 
countries where Russian is spoken, and that have a similar economic system 
and share much in terms of culture." "Meeting with members of the Council on 
Foreign Relations," 16 Nov 08, Kremlin website via www.kremlin.ru. 
(2) " Russia's NATO envoy compares S Ossetia conflict to NATO operation in 
Yugoslavia," ITAR-TASS, 15 Aug 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) In addition to several contemporaneous comments to the effect that Georgian 
President Saakashvili should be removed, a recent report from the French 
President's chief diplomatic adviser confirms the vehemence of Putin's animus 
regarding Saakashvili, see "Vladimir Putin 'wanted to hang Georgian President 
Saakashvili by the balls'," The Times Online, 14 Nov 08 via 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5147422.ece 
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(4) Medvedev: We plainly saw who our true friends were and who weren't," 
Izvestia (Moscow issue), No 189, October 9, 2008, p. 1; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) Putin Receives Tiger Cub For His Birthday, Associated Press, 10 Oct 08, 
02:51 PM EST; Huffington Post via 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/10/putin-receives-tiger-
cub_n_133563.html. 
(6) "Pundit Says Extending Presidential Term Irrelevant to 'Grotesque' System," 
Commentary by Dmitri Furman, 19 Nov 08, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostey; 
www.apn.ru via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 20 Nov 08, 2008-#213. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
National Priority Projects update  
Since the global financial crisis began in September, the Kremlin has worked to 
minimize the damage to its currency, the country’s private industry, and its 
richest citizens.  Just this week, the central bank issued more than 143 billion 
rubles ($5.23 billion) in collateral-free loans to commercial banks, in order to 
prevent the banking system from collapsing (1).  It appears that the entire 
government is focused on preserving the financial stability it has achieved over 
the past decade, or at least in preserving the illusion that the country continues to 
operate successfully.  However, while saving the economy has commanded the 
public’s attention and demanded every possible public resource, other programs 
have begun to fall by the wayside.  Among the first to go are the social programs 
that rose out of the country’s financial success during the first half of the decade. 
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Political stability, economic and technological growth, and raising the quality of 
life of citizens as indicators of Russia’s modernization and strength were themes 
employed by Putin throughout his presidency. On September 5, 2005, Putin 
announced the creation of the Russian Federation’s National Priority Projects, a 
program aimed at developing Russia’s social welfare by investing the state’s 
growing economic resources in the development of the public health, education, 
housing, and agriculture sectors.  These areas were chosen because Putin, the 
chairman of the supervisory Council for Implementation of the National Priority 
Projects, noted that they had the most influence over quality of life for individual 
citizens and in general, “the social health of society.” (2)  At the press conference 
announcing the Projects’ formation, Putin also explained that they were a 
“necessary and logical development of our economic course, which we carried 
out for the previous five years and will carry out further. ... This is a course of 
investment into the people - into the future of Russia.” (3) 
 
There were several reasons for the implementation of the National Priority 
Projects.  First, the Kremlin had streamlined and centralized the government at 
all levels, allowing it to support large-scale government initiatives.  Additionally, 
Putin had sufficient political clout to implement a widespread social agenda, as 
well as Russian popular support.   Further, as previously mentioned, an 
emphasis on social reform and the personal welfare of the Russian people 
signaled to the world that Russia had been transformed into a modern power with 
far-reaching goals that extended beyond the drive to ensure its own political and 
economic survival.  Finally, and perhaps most critically, the state had the 
financial resources to implement such an agenda. At the time, Russia’s natural 
resource and commodity-based economy had recovered from the 1997 crisis, 
and the government was confident that it could fund social programs without 
inviting inflation. (4) 
 
Outwardly, it appeared that the National Priority Projects had become a genuine 
national priority. Under the guidance of then-Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev, 
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the program’s de facto coordinator, the government cultivated a caring and 
benevolent image through the Russian media, where stories of ordinary people 
who were helped in some way by the Projects became the focus of daily news 
stories.  To some, including members of the international community, the 
Kremlin’s “bottom-up” approach to improving the country’s social infrastructure 
was “Russia’s New Deal,” (5) an indicator that Russia finally had moved beyond 
both Communism and the rocky post-collapse era.  Others remained skeptical. A 
2006 opinion poll showed that 58 percent of those surveyed believed that the 
National Priority Projects would not significantly impact their lives, and 47 percent 
thought that the money budgeted for the Project would be misspent. (6) 
Nevertheless, in 2007, Russia’s Finance Ministry announced that it would 
increase national funding for the Projects by 12 percent to 263 billion rubles 
($10.2 billion).  This constituted a 60 percent increase over 2006 spending, but 
was barely notable when considering that in the first half of 2007 alone, the 
national budget was operating with a 1.08 trillion ruble ($41.6 billion) surplus. (7) 
 
Notable was the previously unseen focus on social issues during the 2008 
presidential election. Although Putin’s strong support for Medvedev virtually 
assured his victory, his work with the National Priority Projects, illuminated by 
more than two years of extensive media coverage of his visits to farms, schools, 
hospitals and housing projects, did a lot to raise his public profile. (8) 
 
However, despite the fact that Medvedev had campaigned on the promise that 
the Projects would meet all of their original goals by the end of 2009, (9) since 
the election he has devoted little time to the social issues that helped make him 
President.  Instead of simply ignoring the National Priority Projects, the Kremlin 
has chosen to decrease funding and has announced plans to reclassify the 
Projects as “government programs” with a longer timeline and more relaxed 
standards, reigniting concern that the past several years’ focus on social welfare 
was little more than a short-term plan to garner public support for goals that will 
never come to fruition. (10) 
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It is currently difficult to predict whether these fears have merit. Both the 
President and the Prime Minister maintain that social policy should remain a 
national priority, and that the Projects “significantly add to solving education, 
health care, housing and demography issues – the long-term tasks that should 
become part of Russia’s socio-economic development for the period of up to 
2020.” (11) This assertion is supported by the budget: by the end of 2008, the 
government will have spent approximately 330 billion rubles ($12 billion) on the 
Projects. 
 
However, funding the projects presents a major cause for concern. In the 
projected upcoming three-year budget for 2009-2011, the amount of money the 
State Duma has allocated for the Projects will decrease from 354 billion to 274 
billion rubles in 2111. These amounts appear generous, but not in comparison to 
the 2.73 trillion rubles ($100 million) in state aid that will be distributed this year 
alone to bail out the flagging Russian oil industry. (12) Again, the vast disparity 
between the money dedicated to short-term relief and long-term investment 
indicates that, ultimately, such projects are of little importance to the Kremlin’s 
larger picture. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russia c. bank issues 143.07 bln roubles in loans to banks,” Reuters India, 
17 Nov 08 via 
http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINLH53942020081117.  
Last accessed 17 November 2008. 
(2) “Where was the idea for the national projects born?” National Priority 
Projects, 16 Mar 06 via http://www.rost.ru/main/what/01/01.shtml. Translated 
from Russian. Last accessed 15 November 2008.  
(3) Ibid.  
 9 
(4) “Why propose such wide-scale social measures now?” National Priority 
Projects, 16 Mar 06 via http://www.rost.ru/main/what/02/02.shtml. Translated 
from Russian.  Last accessed 15 November 2008.  
(5) Jason Bush, “Russia’s New Deal,” Business Week, 29 Mar 07 via 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2007/gb20070329_226664.h
tm?chan=search. Last accessed 15 November 08. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) "Russia to raise national project spending 12% to $10 bln in 2007," RIA 
Novosti, 23 Aug 07 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070823/73753727.html. Last 
accessed 15 November 2008. 
(8) “Russia’s New Deal,” ibid. 
(9) Maria Levina, "National Projects under crisis watch," The Moscow Times, 14 
Nov 08 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1010/42/372358.htm. Last 
accessed 16 November 2008. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Alexei Diakonov, "Vladimir Putin: Social policy should become our chief 
national priority," RUVR: The Voice of Russia, 28 Feb 08 via 
http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=23561&cid=56&p=28.02.2008. Last 
accessed 15 November 08. 
(12) “National Projects under crisis watch,” ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Korabelnikov's anniversary message 
Early in November, Russia's military intelligence agency (GRU) celebrated its 
90th anniversary. The agency's boss, General Valentin Korabelnikov, used the 
occasion to speak to selected members of the press and to give his views on a 
number of the strategic problems and challenges facing the country. 
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The first issue addressed was that of the US's planned ABM shield against Iran, 
parts of which are to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Korabelnikov stressed that Russia continues to view the shield as a threat to its 
interests, and that GRU would take the lead in "tracking the progress of the plans 
of the United States to deploy missile defense" in Eastern Europe. Above all, 
GRU is to develop ideas for a "preventative response" to said supposed threat. 
(1) Korabelnikov clearly did not wish to state explicitly what measures GRU 
would take against the missile shield. But, given the agency's past successes in 
atomic espionage, it seems safe to assume that infiltration of installations, and 
possibly technical sabotage will be high on the list of active measures. 
 
Not surprisingly, Korabelnikov devoted some space to the ongoing Georgian 
crisis, claiming that Russia had been forced to act, due to "Georgia's continuing 
aggression" against the "countries" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (2) Just as 
Aleksandr Bortnikov had done for the FSB's special units some weeks ago, 
Korabelnikov praised GRU's special forces, noting that they would "continue to 
participate actively in operations aimed at removing terrorist threats," as well as 
the "bandit underground." (3) The implication clearly was that military intelligence 
Spetsnaz units played a major role in the incursions, although their precise role 
likely will remain secret. 
 
There are two aspects to note about Korabelnikov's utterances. The first is that 
his statements did not deviate at all from the political line espoused by President 
Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This indicates either that 
GRU does not wish to rock the boat, or more likely, that GRU assesses the 
“threats” to Russia in the same way as the Kremlin. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly from a domestic-political standpoint, Korabelnikov explicitly 
addressed GRU's role. He insisted that military intelligence "holds an important 
place in the system of Russia's national and military security," and that "it is a 
powerful and effective tool of protecting its strategic interests by acting from 
positions both in Russia and abroad." (4) 
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In contrast to his contemporaries and colleagues at the FSB, Korabelnikov does 
not speak frequently in public or to members of the press. When he does, 
therefore, there is a clear signal being sent. Given the FSB's expansionistic 
history, his latest comments constitute a repeat of last year's anniversary 
message: GRU is still here…and still functions as an independent, competent 
agency. 
 
Update: Politkovskaya trial 
Late in September, Murad Musayev, attorney for one of the individuals accused 
of conspiring in Anna Politkovskaya's assassination, filed papers with the 
Russian authorities requesting that the forthcoming trial be public rather than 
secret.  At the time, it seemed likely that this request would be denied because 
one of the accused was a serving FSB Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Pavel 
Ryaguzov, and the authorities would seek to avoid inconvenient questions being 
asked about his involvement. (5) 
 
On Monday November 17, the date set for the trial's opening, the authorities 
ruled that the proceedings could be made public.  Three men—the Makhmudov 
brothers (Ibragim and Dzhabrail), and Sergei Khadzhikurbanov, a third alleged 
conspirator, are to face trial at this time. (6) The reason for this ruling became 
obvious during the proceedings: Ryaguzov—despite appearing briefly before the 
judge—is to be tried separately. This trial likely will be used to set the 
government's narrative in the case, namely that of an organized crime vendetta 
against the reporter. Unless this narrative can be established successfully and 
convincingly in the public's eyes – and more importantly in the eyes of 
Politkovskaya's former employers at Novaya gazeta, there is little chance that 
Ryaguzov's trial will also be an open affair. 
 
 Patrushev: Security point man  
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In the aftermath of Vladimir Putin's move to the premiership last spring, Russia's 
Security Services underwent a reshuffle. Aleksandr Bortnikov took over as Head 
of the FSB, while Nikolai Patrushev was transferred to lead the Security Council. 
Last month, Patrushev, in his new role, traveled to Venezuela and India to 
negotiate arms and nuclear cooperation deals, respectively. (7) 
 
During the early part of this month, Patrushev has continued to act as point-man 
on external national security matters, meeting with the Brazilian Minister for 
Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Chinese State Council Member 
Dai Bingguo, both in Moscow on official business.  Patrushev noted that Brazil is 
the "leading country of Latin America," (8) and stated that Russia wishes to 
develop "strategic cooperation" with that country. (9) No information has been 
released about the Chinese discussions, other than a confirmation that 
consultations are to be held on a regular basis. 
 
The South American connection has assumed increased importance for Russia 
in recent months. Russia has requested observer status in the nascent South 
American Defense Council, and reports have emerged that Patrushev also 
visited Argentina on his South American junket to discuss future "technical-
military cooperation" between Buenos-Aires and Moscow. The Argentine 
government reportedly wishes to buy Russian helicopters, and it seems likely 
that this purchase was discussed during Patrushev's brief stop-over in the 
capital. (10) 
 
A glance at a map indicates why Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina have assumed 
such strategic importance for Russia. Moscow is seeking to reassert itself on the 
international stage, and these three countries taken individually or together, 
possess a large percentage of the South-Atlantic coast-line. Long-term basing 
rights for the Russian navy—as well as other assets—may well be included in 
some or all of the weapons or cooperation deals that are to be concluded in the 
near future. 
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At the time of the reshuffle, it was easy to hypothesize (given his status as a 
member of the St. Petersburg “clan”) that Patrushev's new position might mean 
that Prime Minister Putin retained control of national security matters. The fact 
that Patrushev has been entrusted with international security deals seems to 
confirm this hypothesis. 
 
In Brief: Changes at MVD 
On September 6, President Medvedev signed a decree abolishing the Anti-
Organized Crime and Terrorism Department (DBOPiT) of the Interior Ministry. 
The section's functions were transferred wholesale to the MVD's Criminal 
Investigation Department and the Economic Security Department. The decree 
also created a new bureau within the Interior Ministry focusing on "Extremism 
Countermeasures." (11) Early this month, personnel changes connected to the 
decree finally were carried out. Colonel-General Sergey Meshcheryakov, Chief of 
DBOPiT, was granted early retirement along with two of his deputies. (12) The 
new department head for Counter Extremism is Lieutenant-General Yuri Kokov. 
(13) 
 
Russian analysts have posited that the purpose behind the reshuffle is to protect 
the position of Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev. Meshcheryakov allegedly had 
become too strong, posed a threat to the MVD's senior leadership, and therefore 
needed to be removed to protect Nurgaliyev and his deputies. (14) The tactic 
used to do so is reminiscent of Soviet days: decapitate, divide the too powerful 
departments…and rule. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Russian Military Intelligence Watching World Situation Closely," ITAR-TASS, 
4 Nov 08; OSC Summary via World News Connection.    
(2) Ibid.  
 14 
(3) "Russian Military Intelligence Closely Follows Situation In Caucasus," ITAR-
TASS, 4 Nov 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(4) "Russian Military Intelligence Watching World Situation Closely," ITAR-TASS, 
4 Nov 08; OSC Summary via World News Connection. 
(5) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 2 (9 October 08). 
(6) "Politkovskaya Case Opens, " BBC News, 17 Nov 08 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7732760.stm.  
(7) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 4 (6 Nov 8).  
(8) "Russia Seeks Strategic Cooperation With Brazil-Patrushev," Interfax, 10 Nov 
08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(9) "Russian Security Official Calls For Greater 'Strategic Cooperation' With 
Brazil," Interfax, 10 Nov 08; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(10) "Russia Expresses Wish To Integrate South American Defense Council. 
Unattributed Report: 'Russia Wants To Be A Member of the South American 
Defense Council," InfoRel, 31 Oct 08; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection. 
(11) "Russia: Top-Level MVD Replacements. Marina Yurshina Report; 'Ten 
Generals Have Been Stripped Of Their Positions: Top Personnel Reshuffle in the 
MVD,'" Gazeta, 10 Nov 08; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(12) Ibid.  
(13) "Russian Internal Affairs Ministry Reorganizes, Eliminates Organized Crime 
Unit: Report by Yelena Shmayeva, Olesya Gerasimenko and Polina Nikolskaya: 
'The MVD Beats Organized Crime Inside Itself,'" Gazeta.ru, 11 Nov 08; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection. 
(14) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military reform – the long and winding road   
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Traveling down the path of Russia’s military reform, some government officials 
and various interest groups are trying to determine what the transformed military 
ultimately will look like.  Additionally, the recent tragedy aboard the Nerpa (a 
Russian Akula-class submarine) has cast doubts on the proficiency of the 
Russian military industrial complex, which is a critical engine in developing 
technological solutions for transformational change.  In both the organizational 
and industrial cases, there continues to be vociferous opposition within Russia.    
 
Task organization 
 According to the Russian Defense Ministry, twenty-three Russian ground force 
divisions recently have been slated for deactivation, in order to replace their 
combat function with smaller and more agile brigades. (1)  The stated intent is to 
incorporate manpower savings, and therefore Defense Minister Anatoli 
Serdyukov continues to push for the slashing of commissioned and general 
officer billets.  Serdyukov notes, “By 2012 we will have a one-million man army, 
in which officers will account for 15% of the total number of servicemen.” (2) 
 
While the public focus has been primarily on the combat forces, there will be also 
an immediate impact on combat support and service support troops.  Some of 
the reform is based on overhauling a wide array of equipment, as Chief of the 
Russian Federation Armed Forces Communications Yevgeni Meychik notes, 
stating that “a radical reevaluation of the forms and methods for providing 
communications …” is needed for his sector. (3)  The recent combat operations 
in Georgia revealed that the bulk of Russian communications equipment was 
obsolete and did not provide “adequate communications services.” (4)  
Manpower cuts are also on the horizon for combat service troops, namely the 
Russian medical corps.  Military outpatient clinics may be reduced by one-third, 
the number of military hospitals cut by 40 percent, and commissioned officer 
doctors may be reduced by a massive 80 percent. (5)    
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There has been also significant debate on military training and education reform 
that will impact both combat and combat support troops.  Currently there are 
approximately 70 military academies, but Deputy Defense Minister Army General 
Nikolai Pankov has proposed to establish, “10 fairly large schools which will form 
the backbone of the military education system.” (6) 
 
In order to set the tone for military reform, Serdyukov specifically targeted “elite” 
and historically significant organizations such as the 2nd Taman Motorized Rifle 
and 106th Tula Airborne Divisions to be among the first to change. (7)  Head of 
the Institute of Political and Military Analysis Analytical Department, Aleksandr 
Khramchikhin opines that these units were not a random selection.  He notes the 
reforms will become irreversible where, “formations which were a ‘sacred cow’ 
and which had not been touched during any of the previous reforms were taken 
up first.” (8) Essentially, this effort attempts to cut off conservative leaders’ retreat 
to “sanctuary” units in order to wait out the reformation.   
 
Industrial complex 
While the organizational changes are slated to start almost immediately, the 
requirements for technology to power Russia’s military reform, especially with 
regards to command and control, air-to-ground integration, and force projection 
are more daunting.  The glimmering appearance of a resurgent Russian military 
industrial complex was dulled with Russia’s recent tragedy involving the 
submarine Nerpa.  During the 8 November accident, 20 persons were killed and 
another 21 were injured when freon gas purportedly swept through two 
compartments on the overcrowded submarine (224 people verses the usual 
complement of 80-90), which was conducting tests in the Sea of Japan. (9)  An 
officer on board the submarine, Aleksei Shanin, recalls, “We had to smash down 
the doors of the cabins that had been locked.  We took the lads out.  Two breaths 
of freon and that’s it.” (1o) 
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While training accidents occur, regardless of the country, various experts are 
pointing out that this recent submarine incident is indicative of the serious decay 
of the Russian military.  The Vice President of the Academy of Geopolitical 
Problems, Leonid Ivashov opined, “We cannot support our army with the output 
of the defence-industrial (sic) complex on a large scale any longer.” (11)  He also 
noted there are shortages of designers, specialists, and individuals to work 
through the challenges of production. (12)  With regards to the Nerpa, the 
Chairman of the Russian Federation Public Chamber, Aleksandr Kanshin added 
that the accident, “Undermines the authority of the Russian arms manufacturers 
as well as military servicemen’s confidence in the reliability of the Russian 
military equipment.” (13)  Other Russian military analysts, such as Pavel 
Felgenhauer, have deemed the incident as, “a severe blow [that] shows the kind 
of problems many people have been reporting about the Russian defence [sic] 
industry.” (14)  Moreover, Felgenhauer characterizes the challenges of blending 
Soviet-era technology (the Nerpa began construction in 1991) with newer 
technology as not necessarily being a “good idea.” (15)    
 
Voices of opposition 
The Nerpa incident aside, the Defense Minister’s reform program has hit several 
friction points.  Sources report that the bulk of the military officers have, not 
surprisingly, reacted negatively towards these reforms, especially in light of 
massive draw downs within their own corps. (16)  Who is to lead Serdyukov’s 
reform effort?  Major General Sergei Surovikin was appointed recently as the 
chief of the Main Operations Directorate, which acts as the “nerve center” for the 
armed forces.  This directorate promises to play a vital role in Russia’s military 
reform.  The post had been vacant for several months – since Colonel-General 
Aleksandr Rukshin “retired” for disagreeing with the military reforms. (17)  In 
addition, several attempts were made to offer the position to every senior-ranking 
military district chief, however they all allegedly refused;  sources noted that 
these officers, “did not want to participate in the disintegration of the Army.” (18) 
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Debating the merits of military reform on television, Major General Aleksandr 
Vladimirov admitted, “Our victorious five-day war with Georgia showed up the 
poor performance of the General Staff, the poor performance by the command of 
the military district, and the poor performance of the army command.” (19) At 
issue, military pundits continued to argue, is whether or not a brigade-based 
army is the correct, or even useful solution for securing vast regions of Russia in 
a protracted campaign. (20)  
 
Meanwhile, dozens of senior General Officers and leaders of veterans groups, 
acting as part of a greater “military patriotic community of Russia,” attacked the 
proposed reforms in a letter to all citizens.  The signatories noted, “Ours is an 
Army structure that has been tested with time … there is no need nor funds to 
destroy all of that now.” (21)  
 
The first set of organizational changes will begin in the next few months.  Will the 
efforts of the opposition leaders, coupled with the recent submarine accident 
provide enough friction to slow Serdyukov’s military reforms?  Despite the 
opposition, it is likely that the organizational changes will continue to be rammed 
through.  If history is an effective guide, the overhaul of the military industrial 
complex is highly dependent on funds (especially from a stable economy and 
petroleum exports), a large, well-trained industrial work force, and a strong 
research and development base.  This process clearly will take time and may not 
fully synch with the Defense Minister’s plan for reform completion by 2012. 
 
Source Notes: 
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The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
ABM dispute heats up 
Dimitri Medvedev sparked renewed contention over the planned US anti-Iranian 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in Central Europe, when he proposed military 
countermeasures to that program during his address to the Russian Federal 
Assembly.  Medvedev stated that Russia would deploy Iskander missiles to its 
Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, from where they could strike future US ABM 
installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.  However, the planned missile 
deployment is not likely to take place in the near term, indicating that Moscow is 
more interested in staking out a bargaining position on ABM and communicating 
a message both to America’s European allies and President-elect Obama. 
 
President Medvedev outlined plans for countering the American missile shield in 
his state of the nation address on November 5th.  Referring to the proposed 
American ABM system in Poland and the Czech Republic as a test of Russian 
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strength, he explained that Russia would respond with electronic 
countermeasures and the deployment of short-range Iskander missiles to 
Kaliningrad in order, “if necessary, to neutralise the missile defence system.” (1)  
The idea of missile deployments to Kaliningrad, the westernmost piece of 
Russian territory, is not new, but this is the first official confirmation that such 
measures would be enacted in response to the US ABM system. 
 
The Russian president’s comments came as new American compromise 
proposals were delivered to Moscow.  US Undersecretary of State for arms 
control John Rood announced on November 6 that new measures for resolving 
the ABM impasse had been sent prior to Medvedev’s speech, though he did not 
elaborate on their substance. (2)  Initially, the Russian government took no 
position on the proposals, saying only that they were being studied. (3)  On 
November 8th, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice in Egypt, but the two broke no new ground on the ABM issue. 
(4)  Then, a few days later, a Kremlin source rejected Washington’s initiatives, 
calling them “insufficient” and claiming that the current US Administration was 
trying to “put the new US president in a no-way-out situation” on missile defense. 
(5)  
 
If the missiles are stationed in Kaliningrad, it is expected that they will be 
accompanied by additional conventional air and ground units meant to protect 
them from attack. (6)  However, the deployment is unlikely to occur soon, since 
the missiles have yet to be built.  In fact, Russia is curtailing exports of Iskander 
missiles, in order to give priority to outfitting its own troops. (7)  Even so, the 
prospect of any action within the next year is limited.  One analyst, writing in 
Kommersant, stated that he doesn’t expect the Russian army units in question to 
receive the new missiles before 2010 or 2011. (8)  An anonymous source from 
the Defense Ministry was quoted by RIA Novosti as saying that five Russian 
brigades would be equipped with Iskander missiles “by 2015,” though he did not 
say when deployments would begin. (9)  
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With any actual deployment still several years off, Medvedev’s announcement 
probably is meant as a message to the West and to serve as a bargaining chip in 
any future ABM negotiations.  This stance was made explicit in a statement by 
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko, who explained that missiles will be 
deployed only if the US goes forward with ABM.  “If the U.S.A. refuses to deploy 
it,” he said, “there will be no need for the Russian side to take precaution [sic] 
measures.” (10)  
 
The decision likely was meant, in part, to make Washington’s European allies 
reconsider their support for missile defense.  Russia’s representative to the 
European Union explained, “Serious colleagues realize this it is just a response 
[to the US]” and that he hoped the move would not damage EU-Russian 
relations. (11)  Dimitri Rogozin, Russia’s NATO envoy, was characteristically 
brusque in hoping that Warsaw and Prague would consider whether their security 
was worth risking “for the sake of the cunning and selfish interests of the 
American military-industrial complex.” (12) 
 
However, it was clear that the impending inauguration of President-elect Barack 
Obama loomed large over Moscow’s thinking on its ABM stance.  Obama has 
qualified his support for the system by stating that it must demonstrate its 
effectiveness before being deployed. (13)  Medvedev has said this stance “gives 
us ground [sic] for hope.” (14)  Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov linked Iskander 
policy and Obama more directly, explaining, “We acted in an honest way, in 
particular, in relation to the new US administration which [...] would analyse the 
situation [...] in terms of its cost and effectiveness.” (15) 
 
Ultimately, Moscow’s greatest reason for hope on ABM may be the current 
economic crisis rather than any political development. Lean times and conflicting 
priorities will mean renewed scrutiny for a number of budget items, including 
funding for European missile defense.  Russia’s Iskander missile threat may be 
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aimed at making ABM spending that much easier to cut, by increasing the 
political costs of proceeding with the project.  
 
If that is Russia’s intention, the move may have some success in light of the 
enormous fiscal challenges facing Washington’s policy-makers in 2009.  If it is 
not, Moscow assumes apparently that it has given itself a stronger hand when 
negotiating the missile defense issue in the future.  
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Russia promises a nuclear renaissance 
In October, a delegation of public works officials from Qatar paid a visit to the 
Moscow headquarters of Russian nuclear power company Atomstroyexport, 
where they viewed presentations highlighting new construction projects in Iran, 
China, Bulgaria, and India. (1) Atomstroyexport can put on an impressive show. 
The company, a former arm of the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy, now boasts 
a 20 percent share of all global orders for new nuclear facilities, with seven 
reactors currently under construction, beating all of its western competitors. (2) 
 
Qatar is only the latest customer to call on the Russian company to meet a rising 
demand for cheap, clean nuclear power. Developing countries, frustrated by the 
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high price tag and onerous political checklists attached to western-designed 
nuclear power plants, increasingly have turned to Atomstroyexport due to its 
negotiable terms and prompt construction schedule. Last year, the company 
brought the first two units of a nuclear power station on line at Tianwan, near 
China’s eastern city of Lianyungang, and this year it launched the second phase 
of construction. (3) 
 
In February, Atomstroyexport won a bid for four new nuclear reactors in India, 
where it is already engaged in building two units at Kudankulam. (4) “Energy 
security is the most important of the emerging dimensions of our strategic 
partnership,” Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said at the signing 
ceremony. “Russia’s position as a global leader on energy issues is widely 
recognized.” (5) The deal followed a pledge by the United States in 2006 to 
cooperate with India on its civilian nuclear power program, and signals India’s 
abiding preference for the energy policies of Moscow. 
 
In September, Atomstroyexport broke ground in Bulgaria on the Belene nuclear 
power plant, the first post-Soviet nuclear facility built by Russia in Europe. “This 
project is both Bulgarian and European,” Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergei 
Stanishev said, noting that the project had been approved by the European 
Commission. 
 
But the Atomstroyexport project that has attracted the most attention, and 
triggered the most criticism, is Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. Critics claim 
that the plant will put enriched uranium in Tehran’s grasp. Moscow counters that 
the reactor will serve the purely civilian purpose of electricity generation and falls, 
moreover, within the framework of international treaties. (6) Furor over the 
Bushehr reactor’s use overlooks a more fundamental issue: Russia has become 
a provider of nuclear technology to governments that western power companies 
prefer to avoid. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko has engaged in talks 
with Vietnam, Malaysia, Egypt, Namibia, Morocco, South Africa, Algeria, Brazil, 
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Chile, and Argentina. To that list should be added the less than savory regimes in 
Venezuela and Myanmar. (7) 
 
The primary issue is safety. Though the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986 may seem 
like a lifetime ago, the dangers of nuclear power have not receded beyond the 
realm of the possible. Nuclear reactors require rigorous standards of supervision 
and coordination with neighboring countries. If rogue nations governed by 
opaque regimes that are accountable neither to their own citizens nor to foreign 
neighbors obtain nuclear technology, safety cannot be assured. Given the 
magnitude of disaster that can arise from failure at a nuclear facility, the risk is 
immediate. 
 
Lessons have been learned from past mistakes. A repetition of the Chernobyl 
disaster is now virtually impossible, according to a German nuclear safety 
agency report. Russia has modified its reactors, changing the control rods and 
adding neutron absorbers, increasing fuel enrichment for greater stability at low 
power. Nuclear power plants have been fitted with sophisticated computerized 
process control systems and automatic inspection equipment. Atomstroyexport 
has introduced a technology known as a “core catcher” to trap the molten slug of 
uranium in the event of a meltdown, to prevent it from seeping into the earth. (8) 
The new generation of Russian-built nuclear power plants fully meets the safety 
requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (9) So long 
as a country allows international monitoring and participates in multi-lateral 
collaboration with other nuclear operators, safety may be a reasonable 
expectation. 
 
However, new technologies carry new risks. Atomstroyexport is preparing to 
introduce the world’s first floating nuclear reactor, built atop pontoons, in 2010. 
(10) By 2020, the company plans to offer five floating plants that can be towed 
into the ports of coastal countries and connected to the local power grid, for a 
fee. (11) Atomstroyexport is promoting the plants as a source of cheap electricity 
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to the developing world, but critics are wary. The director of the Nuclear Safety 
Project at the Union of Concerned Scientists warns that “its worst day would be 
much worse than a land power plant’s.” (12) 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Economic fallout  
The war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia has taken a 
considerable toll on the Georgian economy. According to Thea Kentchadze of 
the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, the August 
conflict cost Georgia $1.2 billion. Her estimate included investors’ pullouts of 
bank deposits, as well as the environmental damage sustained through oil spills 
in the Black Sea and forest fires. (1) These are catastrophic losses in an 
economy whose GDP totaled $9.8 billion in 2007. (2) 
 
Furthermore, according to the Joint Needs Assessment conducted by the World 
Bank and the United Nations, economic growth has shrunk from 9 percent (pre-
conflict) to 3.5 percent. Foreign direct investment has contracted from $2.1 billion 
to $1.2 billion and investor confidence has declined sharply. (3) The World Bank 
predicted an economic downturn lasting through the first quarter of 2009, with a 
recovery beginning in the second quarter of that year. It is unclear whether this 
assessment took into account the impact of the growing global financial crisis on 
the Georgian economy. (4) 
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The economic impact of the war will be mitigated significantly by aid from other 
countries and international organizations. At a donor conference on 22 October 
in Brussels, the EU and its member states pledged $810.5 million dollars to 
Georgia, over the course of three years. The United States already had pledged 
$1 billion in non-military aid. In concert with commitments from international 
financial institutions and other countries, Georgia’s aid package for 2008-2010 
tallies at a massive $4.5 billion. (5) Of that total, generous amounts are allocated 
toward rebuilding Georgia’s infrastructure, particularly in the areas of 
transportation and energy ($681.6 million and $381 million, respectively). Other 
areas receiving significant contributions are the banking sector and agencies 
providing aid to refugees from the August war ($852.8 million and $350.2 million 
respectively). (6) 
 
It is unclear precisely how the global financial crisis will affect the Georgian 
economy. According to Vladimer Papava, who served as Georgian Economics 
Minister from 1994-2000, there is no “objective reason” why Georgia should 
suffer a currency crisis, as a result of the world-wide economic downturn. (7) The 
Georgian lari did suffer a sharp devaluation on 7 November, when trading at the 
Interbank Currency Exchange (ICE) in Tbilisi closed unexpectedly, causing a 
panic in the currency market. At the time, officials claimed the closure was due to 
technical difficulties. Later however, on 10 November, Acting President of the 
National Bank of Georgia David Amaghlobeli announced that his institution had 
carried out this “correction in the exchange rate” at “the most suitable 
time…chosen for this action.” (8) His statement appears to be a retroactive 
defense of a panicked response. Regardless, any such future corrections should 
be announced before they take place, in order to maintain credibility and bolster 
investor confidence that already has suffered from the war with Russia.    
 
The global economic crisis already has served as the pretext for political changes 
in the Georgian government. When he appointed Grigol Mgaloblishvili as prime 
minister in October, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili transferred the 
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previous prime minister, Lado Gurgenidze, to the position of co-chair of a newly 
established financial and investment commission. According to Saakashvili, the 
new commission will “coordinate attraction of investment and oversight of the 
banking sector. This is a special body, which is created in connection with the 
international financial crisis and this council’s goal will be to avert the financial 
crisis consequences for the country.” (9) According to Saakashvili, his choice of 
Mgaloblishvili also was based on economic motivation. The president cited 
Mgaloblishvili’s connections with Turkey, where he served as ambassador for 
four years, as critical in maintaining that country’s continued high investment in 
Georgia. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Uzbekistan suspends EurAsEC membership 
Approximately one month ago, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted 
a letter from President Islom Karimov to the secretariat of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC) Integration Committee, informing EurAsEC officials that 
the Uzbek government had decided to suspend its membership in the 
organization.  EurAsEC was established in October 2000 by Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; Uzbekistan did not join until January 
2006. (1)  The organization is an outgrowth of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and generally is considered to be one more tool, which 
the Russian government can utilize to exert influence in the former Soviet 
republics – in EurAsEC’s original charter, the Russian Federation was allotted 
forty votes on the Interstate Council and Integration Committee, twice the amount 
of Kazakhstan and Belarus’ vote share, and four times that of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  These voting shares were apportioned based on members’ 
“respected prorated contributions to the Community Budget.” (2) 
 
Although there has been much speculation about the reasons behind President 
Karimov’s decision, neither he nor the Uzbek foreign ministry has issued any 
statements explaining what, to the outside observer, would seem to be a sudden 
about-face on the direction of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.  Since reactivating its 
membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2006, the 
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Uzbek government has appeared to orient itself more toward Russia, while 
allowing its relations with the US and Western Europe to stagnate.  Russian 
companies have been granted a number of potentially lucrative gas and other 
business contracts in Uzbekistan and for the most part, Tashkent has not 
attempted to oppose the Putin-Medvedev regime’s policies in the “Near Abroad” 
or anywhere else.  However, now many are interpreting the EurAsEC suspension 
as a sign that President Karimov’s administration once again is willing to do 
business with Western companies and may be more receptive to the policies of 
the regimes they represent. 
 
In fact, various experts and pundits have linked Karimov’s decision directly to the 
fact that in mid-October the European Union lifted the remainder of the sanctions 
that it had imposed against the Uzbek government following the 2005 civil unrest 
and bloodshed in Andijon.  Karimov’s letter to the EurAsEC committee was 
delivered only days after the EU announced its decision.  Many also consider 
Tashkent’s action to be a clear message and slap in the face for Moscow and 
likely only a harbinger of further rebuffs to come. (3)  One expert, Director of the 
Institute of CIS Countries Konstantin Zatulin, has predicted that, depending upon 
Russia’s reaction, the Uzbek government will choose to withdraw from the 
CSTO, as well. (4) 
 
Mr. Zatulin’s assessment is consistent with the argument that views Karimov’s 
decision simply as the latest stratagem in his attempt to play Russia, the US and 
European Union against each other, in a bid to gain greater concessions from 
each one.  Based upon this line of reasoning, the Uzbek president’s next move 
will be dictated solely by the reactions of these three entities and whichever 
government reacts most favorably will win concessions from Tashkent.  Although 
Karimov’s positions on foreign and economic policy undoubtedly have been 
influenced by Russia and various Western administrations in the past, his latest 
action may be linked more closely to his regional aspirations than to his 
ambitions in the international arena.  By suspending Uzbekistan’s EurAsEC 
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membership, the president has attained more independence and greater 
maneuverability for his administration in its regional relations.  Theoretically, at 
least, one of EurAsEC’s main goals is to increase trade and commerce between 
its member states; the organization’s founding charter calls for the establishment 
of a “Customs Union and Single Economic Space,” (5) which would require the 
signatories to commit to a free trade regime, agree on customs duties, simplify 
customs procedures and adopt unified legislation on the cross-border transfer of 
goods.  Anti-dumping and other protectionist trade policies would be abolished 
and eventually all customs controls within the free trade zone would be 
abrogated, allowing for the free movement of not only goods and capital, but of 
the workforce, as well. (6) 
 
Although an agreement on the “Single Economic Space” was signed in 2003 (7) 
and Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan finally formed a customs union this year, 
(8) few of EurAsEC’s other goals have been implemented – visa regimes and 
customs duties are still in place between the various Central Asian states and 
cross-border trade continues to be hampered by protectionist trade policies and 
complicated, lengthy, corruption-riddled customs procedures.  The Uzbek 
government has been one of the worst abusers of customs and trade policy in 
the region, repeatedly shutting down sections of its border with all four of its 
neighbors, restricting imports and exports of certain products, and planting 
landmines on the borders it shares with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  Citizens of 
other Central Asian states wishing to enter Uzbekistan to visit relatives or on 
business routinely face harassment and even verbal abuse from the border 
guards, who frequently demand bribes in return for allowing someone to pass 
across the border.  Based on the Uzbek government’s post-Soviet trade policy 
thus far, it seems fairly certain that the establishment of a free trade zone 
permitting the unfettered movement of both goods and people across 
Uzbekistan’s borders is precisely the opposite of what Karimov is striving to 
achieve.  The strictures that the imposition of such a regime could impose would 
 34 
severely limit Tashkent’s ability to wield its customs and trade policies as a 
weapon in defense of its own oppressive economic and social practices. 
 
To date, the EurAsEC signatories primarily have ignored the aims set out by the 
body’s charter, however, for the past year, the Russian and Kazakh governments 
once again have begun pursuing the organization’s goals with a bit more 
enthusiasm, as evidenced by their decision to form the customs union called for 
in the EurAsEC’s charter.  Their decision apparently rankled with the Uzbek 
president: an unnamed source in Russia’s foreign ministry told Kommersant 
correspondents that Karimov resented the fact that his country was not included 
in the customs union’s formation.  The source also stated that “…I can say that 
the Uzbek leadership recently has criticized YevrAzES [Russian acronym for 
EurAsEC] repeatedly, saying the organization is ineffective. Karimov even said it 
should merge with the CSTO.” (8) The Uzbek president’s dissatisfaction may 
stem from more than just a sense of having been slighted at being left out of the 
customs union – in fact, his disgruntlement actually may mask dismay at the fact 
that the notion of establishing a free trade zone seems to have found new life.  
Furthermore, his alleged desire to fold EurAsEC into the CSTO could be part of a 
strategy to transform the organization into a more security-oriented entity and 
eliminate the bulk of its economic goals, particularly those which would require 
Uzbekistan to open its borders to regional commerce. 
 
For most of its post-Soviet history, the Uzbek government has hewn its own path 
regarding trade and economic policy and has eschewed any regional or 
international cooperation that would require ceding even a modicum of control 
over its own borders.  President Karimov generally is not viewed as a “team 
player,” unless he is the one leading the team and dictating all of its actions, 
according to his own interests.  He may have hoped that by rejoining the CSTO 
and entering EurAsEC, Uzbekistan finally would be granted a clear leadership 
role in Central Asia’s regional affairs.  Not only have these expectations 
remained unfulfilled, but Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus’ recent action has 
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reactivated the specter of the free trade zone, a concept which threatens the 
Uzbek government’s command over its cross-border traffic, as well as its ability 
to protect and isolate its markets from regional competition.  As a wholly 
independent player, outside EurAsEC, Karimov will have complete latitude to 
make bilateral trade deals with his neighbors, based on what most benefits both 
himself and his administration.  He also retains the right to use Uzbekistan’s 
customs and trade policies as instruments of coercion against neighboring 
countries, a license that he seems to hold especially dear. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Obama’s first Ukraine test – Vanco vs. Tymoshenko? 
During the presidential campaign, Vice President-elect Joe Biden famously 
suggested that an Obama administration would be tested internationally within its 
first six months. (1)  The McCain/Palin campaign quickly listed Ukraine as one 
potential test, with Vice-Presidential nominee Sarah Palin ominously warning of 
an imminent Russian invasion of Crimea.  More seasoned pundits, however, 
suggested that one particular “test” could come when President Obama is forced 
to decide whether to continue the US push in favor of NATO entry for Ukraine – 
and to a lesser extent, Georgia. 
 
But, given the lack of support for NATO entry among Ukraine’s voters (between 
20-30 percent in most polls), it seems unlikely that this will be the first serious 
decision President-Elect Obama will need to make regarding Ukraine.  Instead, 
he likely will be faced with a much lower profile issue, but nevertheless one that 
clearly will signal the direction of the Obama administration’s “Ukraine policy.” 
 
This issue very well could be the ongoing international dispute involving Houston-
based Vanco Energy Company over gas exploration rights on Ukraine’s Black 
Sea Shelf.  The way in which Obama deals with this problem could demonstrate 
whether the new president and his administration view Ukraine only through the 
prisms of Russia and energy supplies, or whether they see the country as a 
nascent democracy with the long-term potential to be a strong ally in Europe.  
 
As discussed in the 24 July issue of The ISCIP Analyst, the Ukrainian 
government “revoked and terminated” its Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) 
with an affiliate of Vanco International Ltd. - a subsidiary of Houston’s Vanco 
Energy Company – in May of this year.  The PSA had a 30-year span and 
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reportedly could have involved up to 15 billion dollars of investments on 
Ukraine’s Black Sea shelf. (1) 
 
Recently, a Ukrainian oligarch acting on behalf of Vanco’s position secured the 
high-powered Washington DC firm of Covington & Burling LLP to represent the 
company’s interests to US officials.  Covington’s lawyer-lobbyists include two 
individuals who worked in the Clinton administration.   These individuals, 
therefore, may be well-placed to secure US assistance either to overturn or 
undermine the Ukrainian government’s decision.  
 
If the US were to do so, however, this could signal acceptance of questionable 
business practices at a time when Ukraine is just beginning its struggle against 
an embedded culture of corruption.  In fact, the majority of companies involved in 
the deal are not US entities, and while a full independent examination of the 
Vanco agreement has not been completed, the information available creates 
concern over the way in which the deal occurred and is structured. 
 
The termination of Vanco’s PSA came several months after the current 
government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko took office.  Upon examining 
the contract, the new government discovered that the rights for Black Sea Shelf 
exploration had been passed from the company originally awarded the tender, 
Vanco International Ltd (US owned, registered in Bermuda), to a brand new 
affiliate, Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd (British Virgin Islands).  Moreover, this new 
company was owned partially by an ally of former Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovych.  Mr. Yanukovych approved the PSA just weeks before turning his 
office over to Tymoshenko.    
 
Thanks to that approval, twenty-five percent of Vanco’s exploration rights were 
transferred to a corporation owned by billionaire oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.  The 
oligarch was and is a parliamentary deputy representing (and reportedly funding) 
former Prime Minister Yanukovych’s party.  
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Akhmetov’s corporation, the Donbass Fuel and Energy Company, was only one 
of four entities with interest “in parity” in Vanco Prykerchenska.  Vanco 
International controls a 25 percent interest, as do Integrum Technologies of 
Austria, and Shadowlight Investments Ltd., linked to Russian businessman 
Yevgeny Novitsky.  (2) 
 
Only Vanco International completed the tender process.  And only after the new 
government took office and demanded explanations did the ownership of Vanco 
Prykerchenska become somewhat more clear.  To this day, however, the 
ownership of Austria-based Integrum Technologies is obscured.  This mirrors the 
difficulty Tymoshenko had earlier in identifying the owners of Austria-based gas 
intermediary RosUkrEnergo.  Eventually, the owners were found to be Gazprom 
and a well-connected Ukrainian oligarch, Dmitri Firtash. 
 
Novitsky’s interest in the deal also has been the subject of much discussion 
internationally.  Myroslav Demydenko suggested in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
“Evgeny Novitsky is alleged to be a member of, or very close to, Russia’s 
Solntsevo organized crime gang.”  (3)  These allegations are examined by David 
Satter in his 2004 Yale University Press book, “Darkness at Dawn – The Rise of 
the Russian Criminal State.” 
 
The new government cried foul on the Vanco deal, claimed a conflict-of-interest, 
suggested several laws were broken in the tender process and terminated the 
contract.  Vanco Prykerchenska appealed to the Stockholm Court of Arbitration, 
and the two sides now have begun the long process of choosing international 
arbitrators and preparing their cases.  
 
Vanco International suggests that the PSA allowed it to assign its rights to its 
affiliate.  It is impossible to verify this claim since the PSA is not a public 
document, but there is no reason to question this statement.  (4) 
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A “Certificate of State Registration” viewed by this author clearly documents the 
transfer of rights, and is signed and verified by then-Vice Prime Minister Andriy 
Kluyev.  The former Vice Prime Minister is a high-ranking member of the 
Yanukovych-Akhmetov Party of Regions.  Therefore, while the correct 
documents were signed, the signature creates the impression – wrongly or rightly 
– that an individual (or individuals) connected to government officials benefited 
from the deal. 
 
Now, US officials are being asked to become involved on behalf of Vanco 
Prykerchenska, which is 75 percent non-US owned and 25 percent owned by a 
Bermuda-based subsidiary of Vanco Energy Company.  
 
Interestingly, US involvement is not being requested by Vanco.  According to 
documents filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Covington & Burling 
LLP was hired by System Capital Management (SCM), which, according to those 
same documents, is 90 percent owned by parliamentary deputy Rinat Akhmetov. 
(5)  It is unclear why Akhmetov chose to hire a lobbying firm through SCM, 
instead of through the Donbass Fuel and Energy Company, which is a party to 
the contract in question. 
 
SCM is being represented by Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, who served under 
President Clinton as the US Ambassador to the European Union and as Deputy 
Secretary of the Treasury.  The Ambassador also worked as the Special 
Representative of the President and Secretary of State on Holocaust-Era Issues, 
negotiating restitution agreements with numerous governments. 
 
He is joined by Ambassador Alan Larson, an Under Secretary of State in the 
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, and current Chairman of the Board 
of Transparency International USA. (6)        
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The stellar resumes and reputations of both men should assist Akhmetov in 
making his case to US government officials.  It is not known what exactly that 
case is, however.  Covington & Burling representatives were not able to discuss 
the issue when contacted.  Nevertheless, those close to the situation in Kyiv 
suggest that Akhmetov and Vanco representatives have asked US officials to 
condemn the Ukrainian government’s actions and to push Tymoshenko to 
reinstate the contract.  A Vanco Energy Company employee reached for 
comment denied this claim.   
 
But, earlier lobbying of US officials in Kyiv suggests Vanco and Akhmetov, in 
fact, are looking for US help against the government (or at least against the 
government’s case).  Shortly after the PSA’s revocation, the US Ambassador to 
Ukraine expressed regret over Ukraine’s decision.  “I am very disappointed that 
the Cabinet of Ministers today took unilateral action to revoke the Production 
Sharing Agreement [that] the Government of Ukraine negotiated with U.S. 
company Vanco,” Ambassador William Taylor said in a statement. (7) Later, 
when questions arose both about the true level of US involvement in Vanco 
Prykerchenska and about the deal itself, Taylor pointedly stopped discussing the 
case. 
 
For her part, Tymoshenko served notice this week that she would not be bullied.  
In a cabinet resolution on 19 November, the government reiterated that it would 
not pursue the PSA with Vanco Prykerchenska and continued to work toward 
arbitration. (8) 
 
Tymoshenko is calling for an international investigation of the agreement that 
could encompass individuals in Austria, Russia, Ukraine and the United States.  
She maintains that the PSA was the result of “a corrupt agreement concluded by 
the previous government.”  (9)  Vanco Prykerchenska, meanwhile, is calling for 
new negotiations.  
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A number of individuals familiar with the issue are quick to note, however, that no 
one, including government officials, appears to fault Vanco Energy Company in 
this deal.  They point to the agreement as an example of how a US company can 
become immersed in Ukraine’s murky business environment, particular if high-
powered political leaders are involved.  Nevertheless, Vanco’s perhaps unwitting 
involvement does not eliminate numerous questions about the company’s three 
non-US partners. 
 
The Vanco dispute does not include Russia directly.  For this reason, officials 
associated with the new Obama administration may be tempted to give the issue 
little attention.  Worse, they may be tempted to depend on the information 
supplied by former colleagues or US businessmen associated with the deal.  If 
this occurs, it will be clear that Washington no longer views Ukraine as a 
potential democratic partner, but rather, intends only to pay attention if Russian 
interests are at play. 
 
But the Vanco issue is at the heart of Ukraine’s rocky, chaotic transformation 
from an authoritarian state to a democracy.  Questionable business and political 
deals undermine the very core of a democratic government.  Transparency and 
fairness cannot exist if agreements are made in the dark.  This issue is one of the 
most important Ukraine will face in the near-term – far more important for the 
country’s development than a decision on NATO. 
 
To be sure, there are no angels in Ukrainian politics and the Tymoshenko 
government’s decisions have produced plenty of their own questions over the 
last year.  Still, the government’s decision to “put a stake in the ground on this 
issue,” could send an important signal about intolerance for corruption in energy 
issues, if the issue is given the proper consideration by international officials.  
(10) 
   
Source Notes: 
 42 
(1) The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV Number 14 (24 July 2008). 
(2) Alexander Serafimovich, “Ukraine’s government says: Vanco go home!,” Oil 
and Gas Eurasia, June 08, No. 6 via www.oilandgaseurasia.com and 
www.eurasiapress.com. 
(3) “Ukraine, Vanco Energy, and the Russian Mob,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16 
Sep 08. 
(4) Press Release, Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd, 12 Jun 08 via PRNewswire. 
(5) Lobby Registration, Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, House ID 31827, 
Senate ID 11195, via http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov and 
http://www.senate.gov/lobby. 
(6) See website of Covington & Burling LLP at www.cov.com. 
(7) “Statement by U.S. Ambassador Taylor on Vanco Case,” Public Affairs 
Section, U.S. Embassy, 21 May 08. 
(8) Unian News Agency, 1843 CET, 19 Nov 08 via www.unian.net. 
(9) BYuT Inform Newsletter, 22 Jul 08 via email to author. 
(10) Ibid. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2008 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1505.html. 
